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HARMONIZING THE BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY
SYSTEMS OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING
NATIONS: SOME ISSUES
Jean Braucher*
By comparing the bankruptcy reorganization systems of emerging
nations with the system in the United States, this symposium raises two
interesting questions: whether a country's stage of economic development
is a major factor influencing its business bankruptcy law and whether it
should be. These questions are important to the consideration of whether
it would be desirable in the long run to harmonize bankruptcy
reorganization systems of developing and developed nations, for example
in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) countries or in
Europe. A country's bankruptcy reorganization system should be viewed
as part of its law and policy of economic development,' but this does not
necessarily mean that a country's stage of development is or should be the
predominant concern when designing a business bankruptcy system.
The NAFTA countries, Canada, the United States and Mexico, provide
a good example for thinking about these questions. Harmonization of
business bankruptcy law in the NAFTA countries is at best a long-range
proposition, so the questions can be considered at leisure. 2 The U.S. and
* Gustavus H. Wald Research Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of
Law.
1. Jean Braucher, Bankruptcy Reorganization and Economic Development, 23 CAP. U.
L. REV. 499 (1994).
2. The American Law Institute's Transnational Insolvency Project is proceeding on the
assumption that "harmonization of the insolvency laws" of Mexico, Canada and the United
States is not "likely to be achievable in the near future." TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
PROJECT: INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW I
(Discussion Draft, April 17, 1996). Rather, the project seeks to "develop cooperative
procedures for...cases involving companies with assets or creditors in more than one of the
three NAFTA countries." Id. See also Harold S. Burman, Harmonization of International
Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2561 (1996)
(Burman, a U.S. State Department lawyer, argues that some procedural harmonization is
achievable by "foregoing the temptation to deal with so-called substantive issues ... ).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Canada, although both developed nations, have bankruptcy systems that
produce significantly different outcomes, with Canada's system offering a
much more restricted opportunity for reorganization than in the U.S.3
Mexico, a developing nation, looks increasingly to global credit markets
but has resisted toning down its highly debtor-protective bankruptcy
reorganization system, which permits insolvent enterprises to linger for
years under court protection. 4 In bankruptcy policy as in geography, the
U.S. occupies a position between Canada and Mexico, but it is doubtful
that this is a result of the differences in each country's stage of
development.
Professor George Triantis argues that economic imperatives will create
a convergence in the systems of similarly developed nations despite
differences in social, political and cultural contexts.5  If this is right
descriptively, however, complete convergence is a process that takes a long
time (maybe forever).6 The convergence thesis is more convincing as a
3. Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A Systems Approach to Comparing U.S.
and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed Companies, 35 HARV. INT'L. L. J.
267, 339-342 (1994).
4. See generally Thomas S. Heather, Mexico's Bankruptcy and Suspension of Payments
Law in DEALING WITH FOREIGN WORKOUTS AND INSOLVENCIF-S 1993: PRACTICAL
STRATEGIES FOR LENDERS AND INVESTORS 121 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 671, 1993). For press accounts, see for example, Craig Torres,
'Vulture' Funds Find That Mexico Isn't Letting Go of Its Bad Loants, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Aug. 15, 1995, available in 1995 WL-WSJE 9086033; Mexico Begins Study of Bankruptcy
Law Reform, Dow Jones Int'l News Serv., June 30, 1995, available in WESTLAW, Dow
Jones Int'l News Plus File.
5. George G. Triantis, The Careful Use of Comparative Law Data: The Case of
Corporate Insolvency Systems, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 193 (1997); see also
LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 3, at 342:
Our thesis is that because both countries [the U.S. and Canada] have market
economies and share the same assumptions and broad objectives for formal
reorganization, it was highly likely, if not inevitable, that the two countries
would develop reorganization systems that function in essentially the same way.
The functional aspects of these systems were shaped not by culture or politics,
but by necessity.
An implication of our Article, therefore, is that the functional aspects of
judicially supervised reorganization systems tend to converge. If we are
correct, any country that opts for court supervised reorganization against a
similar economic background is likely to arrive at the same functional solutions.
Id.
6. The argument that bankruptcy systems are products of economic imperatives is
reminiscent of the argument that the common law is efficient. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th Ed. 1992); John C. Goodman, An Economic
Theory of the Evolution of Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978); George L.
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normative proposition, that a proper balance of economic and political
concerns should eventually result in bankruptcy systems that look more
similar than different. 7  This normative argument, I believe, applies to
emerging as well as developed nations in a global economy. Treating the
point as normative rather than positive underscores that if harmonization
is to occur, for example in the NAFTA countries or in Europe, difficult
political actions will be necessary; economics will not be destiny by means
of the invisible hand, without politics.
To the extent that bankruptcy reorganizations or workouts negotiated
in the shadow of the law succeed in keeping business concerns going, a
bankruptcy system helps to maintain a country's economic base.8 This is
why bankruptcy reorganization law is properly seen as serving a
preservation function in the law and policy of economic development. 9 A
developing nation, which typically is struggling to promote enterprise
formation, is likely to be particularly concerned about protecting existing
concerns. Every business preserved is one less that needs to be created.
Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51
(1977). Both arguments underplay, among other influences, history, politics and
serendipity.
7. My differences with Triantis, developed in the text infra, are matters of emphasis.
In their groundbreaking and impressive comparative study of U.S. and Canadian
bankruptcy systems, Professors Triantis and Lynn LoPucki found convergence and
divergence in the two systems, but they chose to emphasize convergence in the two
systems' functional devices. LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 3. Whether the similarities
or differences of the systems are more important probably depends on one's purpose in
making the comparison. I believe the differences (in light of the similarities) are most
important to one considering reform of either system. LoPucki and Triantis explain this
well:
... [T]he United States and Canada have struck different balances between
their common policies of assuring protection to viable businesses and
preventing use of the system by nonviable ones. Presumably, there is an
optimal balance to be reached between the two conflicting objectives. Given
the difference between the two systems in this respect and the similarity
between them in virtually all others, it should be possible to determine the
relative merits of the two approaches through an empirical comparison of the
outcomes of reorganization in the two countries.
Id. at 342. Unfortunately, there may be too many variables to do such an empirical
comparison in a rigorous way. See infra text following note 27.
8. Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, What is Right about Bankruptcy Law and Wrong about its
Critics, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 829, 836 (1994) (noting that bankruptcy reorganization
"prevents secured creditors from collectively starting a downward spiral of foreclosures and
bank failures that could result in the failure of the entire economy").
9. Braucher, supra note 1, at 499.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
Developed nations in economic crisis are also likely to make the choice to
bend over backwards to protect existing enterprises.'0
On the other hand, any nation-developed or developing-may wisely
be concerned if its bankruptcy system is overly protective of existing
businesses. Keeping corpses breathing on expensive life support
technology will adversely affect credit markets, constricting credit to create
and expand businesses. A long-term view will favor a middle-of-the road
position, allowing a reasonable, controlled chance for reorganization of
insolvent concerns that may be viable, but not making liquidation of
nonviable ones nearly impossible. It is hard, however, to take the long
view in the middle of a financial crisis, as recent Mexican experience
shows."
At a minimum, comparative law offers a valuable perspective on one's
own legal system. Comparisons are certainly eye-opening in the
bankruptcy field. By comparing the U.S. bankruptcy system to that of
emerging nations, one sees that the relative health and stability of our
economy seem to give us the luxury of a bankruptcy and insolvency
system in which the govemment typically plays a passive role. The U.S.
system, sometimes portrayed as involving meddlesome social engineering, 2
seems positively laissez faire when one learns that: in the Ukraine, the
government files most bankruptcy cases; 13 in Hungary, prior to a 1993
change in the law, an insolvent debtor was required to file for bankruptcy
to avoid sanctions;" and in Mexico, the government is frequently a crucial
10. See Bufford, supra note 8, at 836-38 (making this observation about the origins of
U.S. federal reorganization law in the Depression of the 1930s).
11. See generally Kimberly Krawiec, Corporate Debt Restructurings in Mexico: For
Foreign Creditors, Insolvency Law Is Only Half the Story, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 481 (1997). For a press account of Mexico's financial crisis, which has included
much business failure, see Christopher Whalen, A Look at Mexico's Meltdown, WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 1996, available in 1995 WL 3059830 (reporting on Mexico's financial
crisis and resulting business failires).
12. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101
YALE L.J. 1043, 1088 (1992).
13. I am indebted for this information about the Ukraine to the lon. Samuel Bufford,
who discusses bankruptcy law in Eastern Europe generally in Bankruptcy Law in European
Countries Emerging from Communism: The Special Legal and Economic Challenges, 70
AM. BANKR. L.J. 459 (1996).
14. See Pamela Bickford Sak & Henry N. Schiffman, Bankruptcy Law Reform in
Eastern Europe, 28 INT'L LAWYfR 927, 934 & n.19 (concerning mandatory filing aspect
of Hungarian law as the cause of 14,000 filings in 1992, before the law was changed in
July 1993). See id. at 933 (concerning Polish law which also required filing for debtors
ceasing to pay their debts).
[Vol. 17
1997] HARMONIZING BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY SYSTEMS 477
player in litigated cases and in the negotiation of corporate workouts,
sharing the burden by forgiveness and rescheduling of tax obligations. 5
In contrast, the U.S. system leaves the initiative in bankruptcy
reorganizations and in workouts to private parties, with rare exceptions
such as the Chrysler bailout.' 6 In the U.S., business insolvency and failure
are not viewed as political problems in need of political solutions to the
degree that they are in developing nations.
More ambitiously, comparative law can attempt to identify those
aspects of the legal order that are universal and those that are responses to
the particular context. Professor Triantis warns, however, that too much
emphasis on context makes this more ambitious sort of comparative law
impossible.'7 This argument seems to me to set up a false dichotomy.
Rather than seeing the study of the universal and the contextual as in
tension, I would argue that one cannot see one without identifying the
other. The study of the two must go hand in hand, and in the process one
can find many ideas for reform of any given system.
A survey of various countries' bankruptcy systems suggests that the
universal elements, though central, are small in number, yet there are
astonishingly diverse variations in the refinements. In the variety produced
by context, we are more likely to find useful ideas to reform our own
system.
The universals include (1) a seemingly inevitable choice in any system
between shutting down an insolvent enterprise and selling its assets
piecemeal, as opposed to continuing and reorganizing it,' 8 and (2) a tilt in
the system favoring one or the other of these choices. 9 These features
appear even when a system does not formally provide both choices. Even
in countries without a legal mechanism for reorganization, workouts can
and do occur, but of course such a system involves a tilt favoring
liquidation over reorganization. Comparative law study, like law study
generally, is only worthwhile if it looks not just at formal law on the
15. Heather, supra note 4, at 137.
16. See Bufford, supra note 8, at 835 (noting that tax collectors often precipitate
bankruptcy filings by levying on or garnishing assets, but it is ultimately the debtor who
decides whether to resort to bankruptcy).
17. Triantis, supra note 5, at 200.
18. These options do not necessarily line up with legal options. In the U.S., for
example, Chapter 7 can be used to sell a business as a going concern, and a liquidating
plan can be adopted in Chapter 11.
19. See Triantis, supra note 5, at 203 ("bankruptcy is... about enhancing the value of
firm assets").
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
books, but at how people and businesses actually interact in light of that
law.20
Triantis, in his search for universals, may de-emphasize context unduly
and overplay economics as a universal, imperative influence. As an
example demonstrating his argument that economic imperatives cause
systems to converge despite social, political, and cultural differences, he
describes how the Canadian "guillotine" rule, which ends the chance of
reorganization when creditors vote down a plan, led to the practice of
conducting straw polls so that plans could be informally proposed and
amended.2 ' He suggests that economic imperatives will lead a
reorganization system to develop a mechanism, formal or informal, for
amending plans.
But the variations caused by the influence of context, rather than the
universals, offer what may be more important lessons for reformers.
Triantis's own prior work, with Professor Lynn LoPucki, shows the
importance of context.22 The differences between the U.S. and Canadian
reorganization systems are more interesting to reformers than the
similarities. Canadian judges run a very tight ship, using aggressive
judicial administration to weed out cases of questionable viability early.23
The comparison of this system to our own highlights that what is wrong
with ours may be more administrative than formal substantive rules.
Triantis has raised the possibility that our system is administered the way
it is because bankruptcy judges have incentives to lure big, prestigious
cases to their courts by giving debtors breathing room, thus developing
pro-debtor reputations.24 While in general the laxity of U.S. bankruptcy
judges has increased,25 some have been experimenting with more rigorous
administrative practices," seeing an obvious need and perhaps also an
20. RUDOLPH B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 884-890 (5th ed. 1988).
21. Triantis, supra note 5, at 201; LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 3, at 315, 342.
22. LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 3.
23. Id. at 283-87, 311-15.
24. George G. Triantis, The Interplay Between Liquidation and Reorganization in
Bankruptcy: The Role of Screens, Gatekeepers, and Guillotines, 16 INT'L. REV. L. &
ECON. 101, 114 (1996) (contrasting the U.S. and Canadian bankruptcy judiciary and
reporting that the Canadian judges who hear bankruptcy cases are overwhelmingly
concentrated in one court in Toronto, where peer pressure can operate strongly).
25. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble With Chapter 11, 1993 Wis. L. REV.
729.
26. Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management and Delay Reduction: An
Empirical Study, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 93 (1996) (empirical study of the
impact of adopting a case management system by one bankruptcy judge in California, Hon.
[Vol. 17478
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opportunity to make a reputation in this way or a means to head off formal
changes in the law that they might not like. In the U.S., it is likely to be
a long time, if ever, however, before these experiments lead to the same
sort of widespread screening of bankruptcy cases that Canadian judges use.
With the divergence of U.S. and Canadian judicial approaches in mind,
Triantis's example of the Canadian straw vote practice to avoid the
guillotine rule is better seen as revealing contextual response rather than
the universality of economic imperatives. The universals are that
reorganization is always possible, even when not formally provided for or
when disfavored by restrictive rules (such as the guillotine rule), and that
systems will have a tilt toward more or less reorganization. The context
creates different tilts, and there is a normative question about which tilt is
better. The U.S. system allows debtors to try again (and again) to come
up with an acceptable plan, even after creditors reject a plan. The
Canadian system in action also allows for amended plans, but only before
a vote and thus during a much shorter time than in the U.S. This
significant difference is a result of the different tilts created by context.
The identification of universals-the reorganization option and a tilt toward
or against it-helps us to see the contextual response. The contextual
response here is ultimately most interesting to a reformer. It reveals that
plan amendment can occur even if not formally provided for, highlighting
the question whether reorganization should be liberally encouraged by
allowing debtors a long time and multiple votes to come up with an
acceptable plan, as is generally the case in the U.S., or restricted by a
guillotine rule that will allow much less time for amending a plan using the
straw poll practice, as in Canada. Presumably the Canadian system
involves fewer reorganizations and less delay before liquidation. Which
system is better depends on their relative consequences," most significantly
their rates of business preservation and their impact on credit prices and
credit availability for comparable enterprises in the two countries. Given
the many influences on business success and on credit markets, however,
it may not be feasible to isolate the consequences of the differences in the
two countries' bankruptcy systems. Even if rigorous empirical evaluation
were possible, actors in these countries' political systems might still prefer
to rely on hunches rather than social science when making policy choices.
Comparing the systems of two developed nations such as the U.S. and
Canada shows significant divergence and calls into question the strength
Geraldine Mund); see also Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management, AM BANKR.
iNST. J., Dec.-Jan. 1996, at 35.
27. See supra note 7.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
of economic imperatives in shaping the systems. A comparison of various
developing nations' bankruptcy systems also raises doubt that economic
imperatives are a universal. Mexico's very debtor-protective system
encourages workouts rather than actual use of the formal system.28 Many
observers are concerned that the system is too pro-debtor, inhibiting
extensions of credit.29 The concern for preserving going concerns in the
short term in Mexico is understandable, given its economic crisis, but
Mexico may pay a price in restricted credit availability, especially as it
turns to foreign creditors. It is interesting to learn that Ukraine, Poland
and Hungary, which are also looking for outside credit, have tried systems
that force debtors into bankruptcy.3 ° It would be revealing to compare the
economic development progress of developing nations with differing tilts
in their systems, whether toward breaking up or preserving troubled
businesses. Of course, as with comparisons among developed nations, it
may be hard to ascribe differences in the development records of
emerging countries to differences in their bankruptcy systems, given all the
other differences among developing nations. Still, the current lack of
convergence in their business bankruptcy systems-in light of the hope in
all of them of attracting foreign credit-should make us question how
dominant economic imperatives are in the design of bankruptcy systems,
even if as a normative matter economics should be more salient.
International harmonization of business bankruptcy systems will require the
development of shared political visions of what the systems can and should
achieve.
28. Heather, supra note 4.
29. See Torres, supra note 4.
30. See notes 13 and 14 supra and accompanying text.
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